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Juli Thorson and Christine Baker have recently set the spotlight on a verbal activity which, 
in their view, may yield rather positive outcomes in oppressive or discriminating 
environments: venting. This is claimed to play a significant role in fighting epistemic damage.  
 
Although their discussion is restricted to cases in which women vent to other women who 
are acquainted with unfair epistemic practices in the asymmetrical and hierarchical social 
groups to which they belong, in “Venting as epistemic work” the authors contend that 
successful venting can make people aware of oppressive social structures, their place in them 
and possible solutions for the epistemic damage that those structures cause.  
 
As a result, venting enables individuals to regain trust in their epistemic practices, author 
knowledge, and accept their own epistemic personhood (Thorson and Baker 2019: 8). 
 
Damage, Personhood, and Venting 
 
Thorson and Baker’s (2019) argumentation relies on two crucial elements. On the one hand, 
the notion of epistemic damage, which, in an analogous way to Tessman’s (2001) concept of 
moral damage, is defined as a harm curtailing an individual’s epistemic personhood. This is in 
turn described as the individual’s “[…] ontological standing as a knower”, “[…] the ability to 
author knowledge for [oneself]” (Thorson and Baker 2019: 2), or, in Borgwald’s words, “[…] 
the ability to think autonomously, reflect on and evaluate one’s emotion, beliefs, desires, and 
to trust those judgments rather than deferring to others” (2012: 73).  
 
Epistemic damage hampers the development of a person’s knowledge-generating practices 
and her self-trust in her ability to implement them (Thorson and Baker 2019: 2).1 It is 
inflicted when someone cannot assert her epistemic personhood because she fears that what 
she says will not be taken seriously. Consequently, the victim suffers testimonial smothering 
(Dotson 2011) and gets her self-trust diminished and her epistemic personhood undermined. 
 
On the other hand, the authors’ argumentation is based on a differentiation of venting from 
both complaining and ranting. These three verbal actions are depicted as contingent on the 
presence of an audience, expressing “strong feelings” and conveying “agitation about some 
state of affairs or person” (Thorson and Baker 2019: 3), but neither complaining nor ranting 
are believed to involve expectations for a change in the state of affairs that gave rise to them.  
 
Complaints, the authors say, may be left unaddressed or the solution proposed for their 
cause may turn out unsatisfactory and leave it unfixed, while ranting is “a kind of 
performance for someone” (Thorson and Baker 2019: pp.) where the ranter, far from 
engaging in conversation, simply exposes her views and expresses anger through a verbal 
outburst without concern for an ensuing reaction. Venting, in contrast, is portrayed as a 
testifying dialogical action that is typically performed, Thorson and Baker (2019: 4-5) think, 
                                               
1 The feminine third person singular personal pronoun will be used throughout this paper in order to refer to 
an individual adopting the role of speaker in conversational exchanges, while the masculine counterpart will be 









in face-to-face interaction and where the venter does have firm expectations for subsequent 
remedial action against a state of affairs: denied uptake, sexist comments, silencing or 
undermining of cognitive authority, to name but some.  
 
By expressing anger at (an)other individual(s) who wronged her or frustrated confusion at 
their actions, the venter seeks to make her audience aware of an epistemic injustice –either 
testimonial or hermeneutical– which negatively affects her epistemic personhood and to 
assert her own credibility.  
 
Thorson and Baker (2019: 7) also distinguish two types of venting, even if these are not 
clear-cut and range along a continuum: 
 
(i) Heavy-load venting, which is a lengthy, time-consuming and dramatic activity following a 
serious threat to epistemic personhood increasing self-distrust. It aims for recognition 
of credibility and reaffirmation of epistemic personhood. 
(ii) Maintenance venting, which is a “honing practice” requiring less epistemic work and 
following situations where there are “lack of uptake, dismissal, or micro-aggressions” 
(Thorson and Baker 2019: 7). Its goal is reinforcement or maintenance of epistemic 
personhood. 
Despite their valuable insights, a series of issues connected with the features defining venting 
and characterising its two types deserve more detailed consideration in order to gain a fuller 
understanding of the reasons why venting can actually have the positive effects that the 
authors attribute to it.  
 
Firstly, its ontology as a verbal action or speech act (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) needs 
ascertaining in depth with a view to properly delimiting it and adequately differentiating it 
from other related actions. Secondly, in addition to length and goal, a further criterion 
should be provided so as to more accurately characterise heavy-load and maintenance 
venting. Addressing the first issue will help unravel what venting really is and how it is 
accomplished, while dealing with the second one is fundamental for capturing the subtleties 
individuating the two types of venting.  
 
What follows addresses these issues from two disciplines of linguistics: pragmatics to a great 
extent and conversation analysis to a lesser extent. The former, which is greatly indebted to 
the philosophy of language, looks into, among others, how individuals express meaning and 
perform a variety of actions verbally, as well as how they interpret utterances and understand 
meaning.  
 
More precisely, the issues in question will be accounted for on the grounds of some 
postulates of Speech Act Theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and contributions on complaints 
made from this framework. Conversation analysis, in turn, examines how individuals 
structure their verbal contributions with a view to transmitting meaning and how 
conversational structure determines interpretation. Although Thorson and Baker (2019) 
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admit that an analysis of venting from a linguistic perspective would be fruitful, 
unfortunately, they did not undertake it.  
 
1) Venting as a Speech Act 
Thorson and Baker (2019) take venting, complaining and ranting to be three distinct speech 
acts that have in common the expression of anger. To some extent, this is right, as there is 
much confusion in the literature and researchers consider venting and ranting the same 
speech act “[…] and use the terms synonymously” (Signorelli 2017: 16). However, venting 
and ranting could rather be regarded as sub-types or variations of a broader, more general or 
overarching category of speech act: complaining.  
 
Venting and ranting satisfy in the same way as complaining four of the twelve criteria 
proposed by Searle (1975) in order to distinguish specific verbal actions: namely, those 
pertaining to the illocutionary point of the act, the direction of fit between the speaker’s words and 
the external world, the expressed psychological state and the propositional content of the utterance(s) 
whereby a verbal action is attempted. In other words, complaining, venting and ranting share 
similar features stemming from the speaker’s intentionality, the relationship between what 
she says and the external world, her psychological state while speaking and the core meaning 
or import of what she says. Complaining would then be an umbrella category subsuming 
both venting and ranting, which would differ from it along other dimensions. 
 
1.1) Pragmatic and Conversational Features of Complaints 
Pragmatists working within the fruitful speech act-theoretic tradition (Austin 1962; Searle 
1969, 1975) have made illuminating contributions on complaints, which they have classified 
as expressive acts wherewith the speaker, or complainer or complainant, expresses a variety of 
negative feelings or emotions. This is a relevant aspect unveiling illocutionary point or 
intentionality. Such feelings or emotions include anger, irritation, wrath, frustration, 
disappointment, dissatisfaction, discontent, discomfort, anxiety, despair, etc.  
 
This is another key point, but it shows this time the expressed psychological state 
(Edmondson and House 1981; Laforest 2002; Edwards 2005). In fact, the expression of 
such feelings and emotions –a further important issue linked now to the communicated 
propositional content (“I am angry at/disappointed by p”)– differentiates complaints from 
other expressive acts like complimenting, where the expressed psychological states are 
positive: admiration, approval, appraisal, etc. (Wolfson and Manes 1980; Manes and Wolfson 
1981).  
 
The feelings and emotions voiced by the complainer concern some state of affairs –another 
person’s behaviour, appearance, traits, mood, etc., an event and, evidently, some injustice, 
too– which is regarded not to meet (personal) expectations or standards, or to violate 
sociocultural norms. The state of affairs originating the complaint is referred to as the 
complainable and is assessed or appraised from the complainer’s point of view, so complaints 









1993b; Trosborg 1995). As expressive acts, complaints lack direction of fit: neither do they 
reflect the outer world, nor is this affected by or adapted to what the complainer says. 
 
However, complaints could also be considered to some extent informative or representative acts, 
inasmuch as the complainer may make the hearer –or complainee– aware of the unsatisfactory 
state of affairs, which might have gone completely unnoticed or be utterly unknown to him. 
If so, complaints would be hybrid acts combining the expression of psychological states and 
the dispensing of information. Accordingly, they could have a words-to-world direction of 
fit because what the complainer says matches the world, at least from her perspective.  
 
Complaints can be subdivided in various manners. A first twofold division can be made 
depending on whether the complainable pertains to the complainee or not. Thus, direct 
complaints concern a state of affairs for which the complainee is held responsible, while 
indirect complaints deal with one whose responsibility lies in a third party, who may be 
present at the conversational exchange or absent (Edmondson and House 1981; Boxer 
1993a, 1993b; Trosborg 1995).  
 
Another twofold distinction may be made depending on whether the complainer simply 
voices her feelings or has further intentions. Hence, complaints are retrospective acts when she 
just expresses her psychological states about some recent or past state of affairs without 
further intentions, or prospective when she also seeks to influence the complainee and bias his 
(future) course of action (Márquez Reiter 2005).  
 
In discoursive, conversational terms, complaints can be made through just a single sentence 
that is produced as an utterance counting as the core act, or through more than one sentence 
and utterance, either in the same conversational turn or in different ones. Additional utterances 
make up pre-sequences or post-sequences, depending on their position relative to the core act, or 
moves, a label frequently used in the literature on conversation analysis.  
 
Since they often lend support to the complaint by offering further details about the 
complainable, giving reasons for the complainer’s feelings and/or informing about her 
expections, those moves work as supportive moves. A core complaint and the possible 
supportive moves accompanying it are often arranged in adjacency pairs along with the 
utterances reacting to them, whereby the complainee agrees, shows his own psychological 
states, elaborates on the complaint or responds to it (Cutting 2002; Sidnell 2010; Padilla Cruz 
2015; Clift 2016). 
 
1.2) Characterising Venting 
Following this characterisation, venting can be said to be a type of complaining on the basis 
of the following features: its topic or aboutness, its target, the participation of (an)other 
individual(s), dialogicality, length, the newness or known nature of its subject matter, and the 
predominance of the expressive and representative functions or the fulfilment of an 
additional influential or conative function. Of these, the first three features are fundamental, 
while the fourth and the fifth ones may be regarded as consequences of the third feature. 
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Whereas the sixth one facilitates differentiation between types of venting, the seventh 
enables recognition of intentions other than simply voicing feelings about recent or past 
states of affairs. 
 
Although solely produced by one individual –the complainer or venter– venting would be an 
indirect form of complaining that “[…] reveals underlying perspectives [on] a given topic, 
situation, or individual(s)” (Signorelli 2017: 2) and engages (an)other individual(s) who must 
share the assessment of, perspective on and feelings about the complainable, as well as be in 
a position to react in a particular manner or intend to do so in the (immediate) future.  
 
Their sharing such viewpoints and feelings may prompt participation in the discoursive or 
conversational episode through tokens of agreement or commiseration, enquiries aimed at 
getting additional information about the complainable, further verbalisation of negative 
feelings through additional censuring, critique or irritated comments, and expression of 
commitment to future remedial action (Boxer 1993a).  
 
Therefore, venting could be depicted as a dialogic phenomenon that is achieved 
discoursively and requires conversation, to which (an)other participant(s) contribute(s). As 
Signorelli puts it, “[…] venting is deliberately and necessarily communal” (2017: 17) and can 
therefore be described as a type of “participatory genre” (2017: 16) with a specific purpose, 
recognisable moves and characteristic rhetorical strategies (2017: 1). 
 
Its dependency on the contribution of some other epistemic agent(s) makes venting be a 
cooperative action that is co-constructed by means of the joint endeavours of the venter and 
her audience. Its dialogic nature causes conversation to unfold through more than just one 
turn or adjacency pair, so venting episodes may be (considerably) longer variations of 
complaints, which may be performed by means of just one utterance or a brief sequence of 
utterances that is normally followed by reactions or responses.  
 
Hence, venting would require more effort, time and verbal material enabling the venter to 
elaborate on her viewpoints, clearly express her feelings, refine, revise or deepen into the 
subject matter, and/or announce or hint her expectations. Through it the venter seeks to 
secure her audience’s future collaboration, which renders venting a long form of prospective 
complaining. In turn, the audience may show understanding, indicate their positioning as 
regards what is talked about and/or reveal their future intentions.  
 
1.3) Venting and Related Actions 
Venting cannot be judged to differ from complaining on the grounds of the likelihood for a 
solution to a problem to exist or to be plausible, as Thorson and Baker (2019) conjecture. If 
a solution to a problem actually exists, that is something external, extralinguistic. Whether 
the solution is worked out or sought for, and ends up being administered or not, are 
perlocutionary effects (Austin 1962) that escape the venter’s control. Indeed, although 
perlocutionary effects may be intended or expected, and, hence, insinuated and pursued 









given or not is something that totally falls under the audience’s control. Venting nevertheless 
displays pragmatic and conversational properties that single it out as a special manifestation 
of complaining. 
 
On the other hand, venting is also distinct from ranting in that, regardless of whether ranting 
is a direct or indirect form of complaint, it initially excludes the participation of the audience. 
Ranting, therefore, is chiefly a monologic speech action characterised by its length and detail, 
too, but deprived of joint cooperation. It mainly is an “[…] individualistic production of 
identity” (Vrooman 2002: 63, quoted in Signorelli 2017) that is “[…] rooted in self-styling” 
(Signorelli 2017: 12) and whose mission is “[…] to establish and defend a position of social 
distance” (Signorelli 2017: 13).  
 
If something distinguishes ranting, that may be the intensity, vividness and high level of 
irritation or agitation wherewith the complainable is presented, which results in a verbal 
outburst, as Thorson and Baker (2019) rightly put it. Relying on Searle’s (1975) parametres to 
classify speech acts, the strength with which ranting is performed certainly differentiates it 
from venting and also sorts it out as a peculiar manifestation of complaining. Ranting, then, 
differs from venting on the grounds of its narrative nature and emotional intensity (Manning 
2008: 103-105; Lange 2014: 59, quoted in Signorelli 2017).  
 
2) The Two Types of Venting 
As pointed out, Thorson and Baker (2019) differentiate between heavy-load and 
maintenance venting. In their view, the former arises when nothing or very little is known 
about a disappointing, frustrating, irritating or unfair issue. The venter’s action, then, seems 
to be mainly aimed at informing her audience and giving details about the issue in question, 
as well as at making them aware of her feelings.  
 
In turn, maintenance venting appears to correspond to the sort of trouble talk (Jefferson 
1984, 1988) in which people engage every now and then when they are already acquainted 
with some negative issue. This distinction, therefore, may be refined by taking into account 
the informational load of each action, or, to put it differently, its informativeness, i.e. the 
newness or known nature of the complainable (Padilla Cruz 2006). 
 
In informational terms, heavy-load venting may be more informative because either what is 
talked about is utterly unknown to the audience or both the venter and her audience are 
familiarised with it, but have not dealt with it beforehand. Both the informative –or 
representational– and the expressive function play a major role in this sort of venting: along 
with conveying her feelings the venter also dispenses information, the possession of which 
by the audience she considers is in her interest.  
 
The informativeness of maintenance venting, in contrast, would be lesser, as the venter and 
her audience are already acquainted with a troublesome or disrupting state of affairs because 
they have previously discussed it in previous encounters. Although this type of venting still 
fulfils an informative or representational function, this is subservient to the expressive 
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function and to an additional one: affirming or strengthening common viewpoints and 
feelings (Padilla Cruz 2004a, 2004b, 2005). This is essential for aligning the audience with 
herself or positioning them along with her as regards the complainable. 
 
The low level of informativeness of maintenance venting and the affirmation or 
reinforcement of common viewpoints that it achieves render this sort of venting a phatic 
action in the sense of anthropologist Bronisław K. Malinowski (1923). It is of little 
informational relevance, if this is understood to amount to the newness or unknown nature 
of information, and, therefore, of scarce importance to the audience’s worldview. Even if 
maintenance venting does not significantly improve or alter their knowledge about the 
vented issue, like phatic discourse, it does nevertheless fulfil a crucial function: creating or 
stressing social affinity, rapport, bonds of union, solidarity and camaraderie between the 
venter and her audience (Padilla Cruz 2004a, 2004b, 2005).  
 
These effects stem from venting’s implication that the interlocutors brought together have 
similar viewpoints and feelings about a problematic or unfair state of affairs. Maintenance 
venting, so to say, insinuates or highlights that the interlocutors may be equally affected by 
what is talked about, expect a similar reaction or react to it in a similar manner. It fosters a 
feeling of in-group membership through a topic with which the interlocutors are equally 
acquainted, which similarly impacts them and towards which they also hold akin attitudes 
(Padilla Cruz 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
Venting satisfies criteria that enable its classification as a manifestation of complaining 
behaviour. Owing to its target –a third party– topic –some recent or past state of affairs– 
and fulfilment of expressive, representative and conative functions, it amounts to an indirect 
prospective form of complaint. Its conversational features make it exceed average 
complaints made through just one conversational turn or adjacency pair, so venting requires 
more time and effort. However, if there are characteristics significantly distinguishing 
venting, these are dialogicality and engagement of the audience. 
 
Venting certainly depends on the presence and participation of the audience. It must be 
jointly or cooperatively accomplished through dialogue, so it must be seen and portrayed as a 
communal action that is discoursively achieved. The audience’s participation is crucial for 
both the acknowledgement of a troublesome state of affairs and the achievement of the 
ultimate goal(s) sought for by the venter: fighting or eradicating the state of affairs in 
question. While dialogicality and participation of the audience facilitate differentiation 
between venting and another type of complaint, namely, ranting, the level of informativeness 
of what is vented helps more accurately distinguish between heavy-load and maintenance 
venting.  
 
It is along these pragmatic and conversational features that venting may be more precisely 









understanding of why it may have the effects that Thorson and Baker (2019) ascribe to it, 
other issues still need considering. They are left aside for future work. 
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